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BEYOND THE TARGET MARKET: PRODUCT
ADVERTISING AND RULE 10B-5’S “IN
CONNECTION WITH” REQUIREMENT
THOMAS J. MOLONY*
ABSTRACT
An investor purchases Apple common stock in reliance on representations in
advertisements that the new iPad is capable of connecting to “ultrafast” 4G wireless
networks. It turns out that the iPad is not compatible with the fastest wireless
network in Australia or the 4G networks in Sweden and Germany. If the investor
suffered a loss as a result, can the investor recover from Apple for securities fraud
under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934?
A number of possible impediments to recovery exist. One is Rule 10b-5’s
limited scope. The Rule applies only to a fraud that is “in connection with” a
securities transaction, and whether a false or misleading statement primarily directed
to consumers has the requisite connection is an open question.
This Article evaluates Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement as it relates
to product advertisements and concludes that false or misleading statements in
advertisements are actionable under the Rule. The Article also suggests that, to
determine whether a particular advertisement meets the “in connection with”
requirement, courts should look to factors considered in determining whether an
advertisement is an “offer” under the Securities Act of 1933.
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INTRODUCTION
Introducing the new iPad. With the stunning Retina display. 5 MP iSight
camera. And ultrafast 4G LTE.
It’s brilliant. In every sense of the word. Pick up the new iPad and
suddenly, it’s clear. You’re actually touching your photos, reading a
book, playing the piano. Nothing comes between you and what you love.
To make that hands-on experience even better, we made the fundamental
elements of iPad better—the display, the camera, the wireless connection.
All of which makes the new, third-generation iPad capable of so much
more than you ever imagined.1
Apple excitedly released its new iPad across the globe in March 2012,2 but for
those in Australia, Sweden, and Germany, Apple’s suggestion that the device was
“capable of so much more than [they] ever imagined” did not necessarily ring true—
at least not as to the 4G LTE wireless connection. The new iPad, it turned out, was
incompatible with the fastest wireless network in Australia and the 4G networks in
Sweden and Germany.3 Purchasers of new iPads in those countries had a right to be
disappointed.
In Australia, Apple had marketed one model of the new iPad as “iPad with WiFi
+ 4G,” using that designation on its Australian website and online store, on signs in
Apple retail stores, and in marketing materials provided to and used by other

1

Shirley Brady, Is Apple’s New iPad Resolutionary Enough to Drive Sales?,
BRANDCHANNEL (Mar. 7, 2012 4:31 PM), http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post/AppleiPad-3-Reveal-030712.aspx.
2

See id. (reproducing “Apple’s iPad 3 pitch”).

3

Robb M. Stewart, New iPad Sparks Debate Over 4G Overseas, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29,
2012 2:33 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230381650457730828
2123733976.html.
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retailers.4 The fact that the iPad was incompatible with the Telstra LTE network, the
only commercially available LTE network in Australia at the time of the new iPad’s
release, caught the attention of the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission
(ACCC). The ACCC filed a lawsuit against Apple in the Federal Court of Australia,
claiming that using the “iPad with WiFi + 4G” designation was misleading to
consumers and violated the Australian Consumer Law.5 In response to the lawsuit,
Apple agreed to modify its website and promotional materials to make clear that the
new iPad was not compatible with the Telstra network and offered refunds to those
who purchased new iPads before the ACCC filed its suit.6
As a result of Apple’s compliance with the ACCC’s demands, consumers in
Australia were made whole. But what about an investor who purchased Apple
common stock in reliance on the statements on Apple’s website and other
promotional materials about the iPad’s ability to connect with 4G networks? If
Apple’s statements were in fact misleading7 and the investor suffered a loss as a
result, could the investor recover from Apple for violating the antifraud prohibition
of Rule 10b-58 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)?9 The
answer depends in part on whether Apple’s statements were made “in connection
with” the investor’s purchase of Apple common stock.10

4
Australian Competition & Consumer Comm’n v. Apple Pty Ltd. [2012] FCA 646, ¶ 12
(Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2012/646.html.
5

See ACCC to Seek Orders Against Apple for Alleged Misleading iPad “4G” Claims,
COMPETITION
&
CONSUMER
COMM’N
(Mar.
27,
2012),
AUSTRALIAN
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1042020 (“The Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission will be making an application to the Federal Court in Melbourne
. . . for orders against Apple Pty Limited and Apple Inc (Apple) for alleged contraventions of
the Australian Consumer Law (ACL).”).
6

Apple Pty Ltd Provides Undertaking in Response to ACCC “iPad with WiFi + 4G”
Urgent Application, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1042357. In June 2012, the Australian
Federal Court fined Apple AUD $2.25 million for violating the consumer law. Apple, [2012]
FCA 646 at ¶ 51.
7
In the lawsuit brought by the ACCC, Apple admitted that the designation “iPad with
WiFi + 4G” was misleading to consumers. Apple, [2012] FCA 646 at ¶ 11. Such an
admission does not mean, however, that the designation would have been misleading to
investors. This is particularly true in light of the fact that a footnote on Apple’s website stated
at the time of the ACCC lawsuit that “4G LTE is supported only on AT&T and Verizon
networks in the U.S. and on Bell, Rogers, and Telus networks in Canada.” See Stewart, supra
note 3.
8

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).

9

15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006).

10
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (applying only when a fraud is “in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security”). That a false or misleading statement was “in
connection with” a securities transaction is only one of several elements that a plaintiff must
establish to recover under Rule 10b-5. See infra notes 24–26 and accompanying text
(describing the elements of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5).
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Rule 10b-5’s scope is broad,11 but not unlimited. It extends only to fraud that is
“in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security.”12 Courts have struggled to
define the meaning of this limit, however, and whether a false or misleading
statement in a product advertisement—which typically is directed to customers and
not investors—is within the limit is an open question.
This Article contends that false and misleading statements in product
advertisements may meet Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement. Finding
support in recent empirical studies regarding the effect of advertising on the market
prices of securities and in the treatment of advertisements under provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) governing securities offerings, the Article
concludes that product advertisements can satisfy the “in connection with” tests
applicable to publicly disseminated statements.
Part I of this Article offers an overview of Rule 10b-5 and the elements for civil
enforcement actions, criminal prosecutions, and private causes of action under the
Rule. Part II follows with a detailed discussion of the “in connection with”
requirement. It explains the limited guidance provided by the Supreme Court, the
various general approaches taken by the United States Courts of Appeals, and the
rules applied by certain courts of appeals to cases involving publicly disseminated
statements. In Part III, the Article discusses the handful of cases that have
considered whether statements in product advertisements can satisfy the “in
connection with” requirement. Part III also explains the criticisms leveled against
the only federal appellate decision with respect to product advertisements.
Responding to these criticisms, Part IV explains why false or misleading statements
in product advertisements may satisfy Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus requirement.
It spells out how product advertisements fit within the principles courts have applied
to publicly disseminated information, describes the conclusions reached in recent
empirical studies as to the effect of advertising on securities prices, and details how
product advertisements are treated for purposes of the Securities Act. Part V
suggests that, if the “in connection with” requirement merely demands a causal
connection, product advertisements of public companies likely will satisfy the
requirement in most cases. Drawing on principles and rules used to determine when
an advertisement represents an “offer” for purposes of the Securities Act, Part V also
recommends factors that courts should consider in determining whether the “in
connection with” requirement is met with respect to a particular advertisement. The
Article concludes that Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement is not a serious
impediment to a securities fraud claim arising out of false or misleading statements
in product advertisements and that companies that fail to bear this in mind when
crafting marketing materials do so at their own peril.

11

See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.1[3][B][2], at 437
(6th ed. 2009) (“Rule 10b-5 is the broadest of the section 10(b) rules. . . . Because of its broad
language, Rule 10b-5 covers a wide variety of conduct . . . .”).
12
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012); see Marine Bank v. Baker, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982)
(“Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy
for all fraud.”).
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I. RULE 10B-5—AN OVERVIEW
Rule 10b-5, which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted in
1942 pursuant to its authority under Exchange Act § 10(b),13 is perhaps the most farreaching antifraud provision of the federal securities laws.14 The Rule proscribes at
least three different categories of fraud:15 (i) misstatements,16 (ii) misleading
statements,17 and (iii) pure omissions (i.e., silence when there is a duty to disclose
certain information).18 False or misleading statements and omissions are prohibited,
however, only when they are material—that is, when there is a “substantial
likelihood that the [statement or omission] would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information
made available.”19 Moreover, to run afoul of Rule 10b-5, a person must act with
scienter, which the Supreme Court has defined as “a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud”20 and which lower courts have expanded to include
reckless behavior.21
13
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729
(1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
14

See HAZEN, supra note 11, § 12.3[2], at 442 (noting that “[i]n Rule 10b-5 [the SEC]
fashioned its most encompassing antifraud prohibition [and] . . ., without even realizing its
eventual reach, created a powerful antifraud weapon”).
15
See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 281 (3d ed. 2012) (identifying “omissions in breach of fiduciary duty,” “halftruths,” and “affirmative misstatements” as three categories of Rule 10b-5 fraud). The Rule
may extend beyond these three categories because it more generally prohibits “any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud” and “any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2012).
16
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o make
any untrue statement of a material fact.”).
17

See id. (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading . . . .”).
18
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2012); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230
(1980) (indicating that liability for a failure to disclose material information only arises if
there is a duty to disclose); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
152-53 (1972) (noting that Rule 10b-5’s prohibition against fraud by pure omission is found in
the first and third subparagraphs of the Rule).
19

Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).

20

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). The Court stated expressly
that it was not ruling on whether recklessness may constitute scienter. See id. (“We need not
address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for
civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”). In Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme Court
determined that scienter also is required for SEC enforcement actions. Aaron v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); see HAZEN, supra note 11, § 12.8[1], at 457 (“The
Supreme Court . . . held in Aaron v. SEC that the scienter standard applies under Rule 10b-5
regardless of whether the action is one for damages or an enforcement action brought by the
Commission.”).
21
See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“Reckless conduct may also constitute scienter.”); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs
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Rule 10b-5 is subject both to civil enforcement by the SEC and criminal
enforcement by the United States Department of Justice.22 To be successful in a civil
enforcement action or criminal prosecution, the SEC or the Department of Justice
must prove that the defendant made a material misstatement or omission and acted
with scienter and that the misstatement or omission was made “in connection with” a
securities transaction.23
Rule 10b-5 also may be enforced by private plaintiffs. 24 Standing for a private
cause of action, however, is limited to purchasers and sellers of securities and does
not extend to those who fail to purchase or sell securities because of fraudulent
misstatements or omissions.25 To prevail in a private cause of action, in addition to
elements that the SEC and the Department of Justice must prove (material
misstatement or omission, scienter, and connection to a securities transaction), a
plaintiff must establish that he or she reasonably relied on the misstatement or
omission and that the misstatement or omission caused a loss to the plaintiff.26
Although reliance generally is required for a private cause of action under Rule
10b-5, the Supreme Court has reduced the burden on plaintiffs to prove reliance in
Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[L]iability requires proof of the defendant’s
‘scienter,’ which is to say proof that he either knew a statement was false or was reckless in
disregarding the substantial risk that it was false.”); ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,
493 F.3d 87, 99 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In a Rule 10b-5 action, scienter requires a showing of
‘intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,’ or reckless conduct. (internal citations omitted));
Robert N. Clemens Trusts v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“[W]e have ‘long premised liability on at least reckless behavior.’”); Hollinger v. Titan
Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Our circuit, . . . along with ten other
circuits, has held that recklessness may satisfy the element of scienter in a civil action for
damages under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
22
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2006) (authorizing SEC actions to enforce rules under the
Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006) (providing for fines and imprisonment).
23

See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2009)
(listing the elements of a civil enforcement action); United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846,
861 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (listing the requirements for a criminal prosecution). In a criminal
prosecution, a higher standard for scienter applies, requiring the government to prove that the
defendant acted willfully; see 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006) (requiring a willful violation of the
Exchange Act for imprisonment or criminal penalty).
24

Although the text of the Rule does not specify a private cause of action, courts have
found that one is implied. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975); see also Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (“It is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).”).
25

See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730-31 (noting that, in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), the Second Circuit determined that plaintiffs in a private
cause of action under Rule 10b-5 were “limited to actual purchasers and sellers of securities”
and holding that Birnbaum was decided correctly).
26

See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)
(listing the elements of a private cause of action); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
338 (2005) (“A private plaintiff who claims securities fraud must prove that the defendant’s
fraud caused an economic loss.”); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir.
2000) (listing the elements of a private cause of action); United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf
(Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (same).
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two significant respects. First, if a fraud is accomplished through a pure omission, a
plaintiff need not prove reliance at all.27 Second, for securities traded in an efficient
market, a plaintiff may qualify for a rebuttable presumption of reliance.28
The Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson approved the use of a presumption of
reliance based on the “fraud-on-the market” theory,29 which posits that materially
false or misleading statements made to the public affect the market price of a
security and that a person purchasing at the market price may be defrauded even if
the person does not know of the statements.30 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has explained:
When someone makes a false (or true) statement that adds to the supply of
available information, that news passes to each investor through the price
of the stock. And since all stock trades at the same price at any one time,
every investor effectively possesses the same supply of information. The
price both transmits the information and causes the loss. This approach,
dubbed the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, supplants “reliance” as an
independent element by establishing a more direct method of causation.31
Accordingly, to qualify for the presumption, courts generally require a plaintiff to
prove that the applicable securities were traded in an efficient market and that the
defendant publicly made misrepresentations.32
27

See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (“Under
the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be
material . . . .”).
28

See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“Because most publicly available
information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public
misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”).
29

See id. at 250 (“It is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance supported by
the fraud-on-the-market theory.”).
30
See id. at 241-42 (explaining the “fraud-on-the-market” theory). The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has explained the theory as follows:

The fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance and its relationship to market
efficiency can thus be reduced to the following syllogism: (a) an investor buys or sells
stock in reliance on the integrity of the market price; (b) publicly available
information, including material misrepresentations, is reflected in the market price;
and therefore, (c) the investor buys or sells stock in reliance on material
misrepresentations. This syllogism breaks down, of course, when a market lacks
efficiency, and the market does not necessarily reflect the alleged material
misrepresentation.
In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005).
31

Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2010).

32

See, e.g, Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27 (noting the elements required by the Sixth Circuit
for the presumption); Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1172
(9th Cir. 2011) (describing the requirements for the presumption); In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir. 2011) (same); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d
474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008) (same); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487
F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2007) (same).
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II. RULE 10B-5’S “IN CONNECTION WITH” REQUIREMENT
A. The Supreme Court’s Limited Guidance
In 1989, Edward Fletcher identified six different categories of cases in which
Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement is at issue.33 The Supreme Court,
however, has addressed the requirement in only three cases, all of which were in a
single category. In all three cases, the relevant fraud involved the misappropriation
of assets, and in all three, the Court found that the fraud was “in connection with” a
securities transaction for purposes of Rule 10b-5.34
The Supreme Court first addressed Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with”
requirement—or the “transactional nexus” requirement, as it is sometimes called35—
in 1971 in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., which involved a
complex scheme under which the purchaser of a corporation’s stock misappropriated
corporate assets to pay the purchase price of the stock. 36 Twenty-five years later in
United States v. O’Hagan, the Court considered whether trading in securities of a
company based on information misappropriated from someone other than the
company represents fraud “in connection with” a securities transaction in violation
of the prohibition against insider trading under Rule 10b-5.37 Most recently, in SEC
v. Zandford, the Court addressed whether a broker’s misappropriation of proceeds of
sales of his clients’ securities met the “in connection with” requirement.38
In Bankers Life, the Court famously declared that a fraud must “touch” a
securities transaction to have the necessary transactional nexus.39 Similarly, in
O’Hagan and Zandford, the Court emphasized that, to meet the “in connection with”
requirement, a fraud must “coincide” with a securities transaction.40 These
characterizations, while often repeated, provide little practical guidance regarding
33
See C. Edward Fletcher, III, The “In Connection With” Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 16
PEPP. L. REV. 913, 929-59 (1989) (identifying and discussing six common fact scenarios
appearing in transactional nexus cases).
34

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 (2002); United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655-56 (1997); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9 (1971).
35

See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2008)
(describing claim that a fraud “lacked the requisite nexus to any securities transactions” as an
argument that the “in connection with” requirement was not met); Ind. Elec. Workers Pension
Trust Fund v. Millard, No. 07 Civ. 172(JGK), 2007 WL 2141697, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 25,
2007) (“[F]raud is ‘in connection with’ a purchase or sale when there is a ‘transactional nexus’
between the fraud and the transaction.”).
36

Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10.

37

O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.

38

Zandford, 535 U.S. at 815.

39

See Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12-13 (“The crux of the present case is that Manhattan
suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities to an
investor.”).
40
Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822 (“It is enough that the scheme to defraud and the sale of
securities coincide.”); O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“The securities transaction and the breach of
duty thus coincide.”).
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how far Rule 10b-5 extends. As some have noted, to say that a fraud must “touch”
or “coincide” with a securities transaction does little more than restate the
requirement under Rule 10b-5 that a fraud be “in connection with” a securities
transaction. 41
O’Hagan and Zandford, though, did more than just rephrase the “in connection
with” requirement. In each case, the Court determined that the misappropriation at
issue met the “in connection with” requirement because a securities transaction was
necessary to complete the fraud.42 It is unclear, however, whether the Court intended
this necessity test to apply outside the misappropriation context.
Regardless of what the Court in O’Hagan and Zandford may have intended,
lower courts have applied the necessity test to cases not involving misappropriation,
and they have done so with varying degrees of success. Two examples are the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Rowinski v.
Salomon Smith Barney Inc.43 and the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC.44 A comparison of the two
cases illustrates the limitations of the necessity test and suggests that the test does
not—or should not—apply broadly to the “in connection with” requirement.
In Rowinski, retail brokerage customers of Salomon Smith Barney (SSB) sued
SSB, alleging that, to “reap hundreds of millions of dollars in investment banking
fees,” SSB had produced investment research reports that reflected overly favorable
views of its investment banking clients.45 The customers did not claim, however,
that SSB had violated Rule 10b-5. Instead, they brought state law claims for breach

41
See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2012) (“But the test [the Supreme
Court] has offered—whether or not ‘the fraud alleged “coincide[s]” with a securities
transaction’—is not particularly descriptive.” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in
original)); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“[T]o say that a fraud is ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction whenever it ‘coincides’
with that transaction hardly clarifies the matter.”); Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
726 F.2d 930, 942 (2d Cir. 1984) (“We are inclined to agree . . . that ‘there is no reason to
believe that [Justice Douglas’s] use of “touching” [in Bankers Life] was anything more than
his variation of “in connection with” as a matter of literary style.’”); Fletcher, supra note 33,
at 962 (emphasizing that the concept of “touching” was a product of Justice’s Douglas’s
literary style and that he merely was stating in a different way that the fraud must be “in
connection with” a securities transaction).
42

See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820 (“The securities sales and respondent’s fraudulent
practices were not independent events.”); id. at 825 (“[T]he fraud was not complete before the
sale of securities occurred.”); O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (noting that the “in connection with”
requirement “is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary
gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the
information to purchase or sell securities.”).
43

See Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825, and considering whether the fraud “necessarily ‘coincides’ with
the purchase or sale of securities”).
44
See Pirate Investor, 580 F.3d at 244 (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820-21, and including
as a factor in a multi-factor test “whether a securities sale was necessary to the completion of
the fraudulent scheme”).
45

Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 296-97.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013

9

110

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:101

of contract, unjust enrichment, and violations of consumer protection laws,46 and the
question the Third Circuit faced was whether the state law claims were permitted
under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act,47 a 1998 law that precludes
certain state law class actions with respect to fraud “in connection with the purchase
or sale of” securities.48 To answer this question, the Third Circuit applied precedent
with respect to the “in connection with” requirement under Rule 10b-5.49 Based on
that precedent, the Third Circuit found that securities transactions coincided with the
fraud as contemplated by Zandford because the transactions were necessary to the
success of the alleged fraud.50 The court reasoned that, without the transactions, the
share prices of SSB’s investment banking clients would not have increased and,
without increases in the share prices, the clients would not have given SSB the
investment banking business SSB wanted.51
In Pirate Investor, the Fourth Circuit considered whether an e-mail stock tip
containing misrepresentations violated Rule 10b-5.52 In May 2002, the editor-inchief of Pirate Investor, LLC, a publisher of investment newsletters, sent multiple

46

Id.

47

Id. at 296.

48

15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1) (2006). Congress enacted the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) to curb state law class action lawsuits with respect
to nationally-traded securities that began to arise after Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006). In the PSLRA, Congress
adopted a number of measures designed to curtail abuses in federal antifraud class action
lawsuits involving nationally traded securities. Id. at 81. Among other things, PSLRA
established stringent pleading requirements, limited damages and attorneys’ fees, allowed
discovery to be stayed until any motion to dismiss was resolved, and penalized those bringing
frivolous lawsuits. Id. at 81-82. After PSLRA was enacted, plaintiffs started bringing
securities class actions under state law to avoid PSLRA’s restrictions. Id. at 82. SLUSA was
designed to stop the proliferation of these lawsuits by providing for federal preemption of
state law class actions brought on behalf of over fifty people in which a plaintiff alleges “a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security” or “that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
49

Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299. The Supreme Court later indicated the meaning of the
phrase “in connection with” is the same under SLUSA as it is under Rule 10b-5. See Dabit,
547 U.S. at 85 (considering the meaning of the phrase “in connection with” in SLUSA and
indicating that “when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory
provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the
intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well”). Accordingly, other courts have
concluded that the phrase “‘in connection with the purchase or sale’ of a security under
SLUSA covers the same range of activities that the SEC could prosecute as violations of §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.” Instituto De Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1348
(11th Cir. 2008); Siepel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 526 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2008).
50

Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 302.

51

Id.

52

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 2009).
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waves of e-mails containing a stock tip to over 800,000 individuals.53 The e-mails
suggested that, based on information purportedly obtained from a senior executive of
a mystery company, the editor knew that the mystery company was going to
announce a major transaction on May 22 and that investors could profit from buying
the mystery company’s stock prior to that time.54 The e-mails further indicated that,
for $1,000, an e-mail recipient could receive a special report divulging the name of
the mystery company.55 Pirate received over $600,000 from sales of the special
report to over 1,200 investors.56 Unfortunately for those who purchased the report
and the stock of the mystery company, May 22 came and went without any
announcement, and it turned out that a mystery company senior executive had not
told Pirate’s editor that the transaction was to be announced on that date.57
According to the Fourth Circuit, the facts in Pirate Investor indicated that a
securities transaction was necessary to complete the fraud. The court explained that
Pirate sent out its e-mails in multiple waves and that the e-mails in later waves
touted stock purchases by investors who had received earlier e-mails and highlighted
the fact that the mystery company’s stock price had risen, which the district court
found resulted from the earlier purchases.58 The court concluded, then, that “[t]he
fraud was not complete when investors paid $1,000 to learn the identity of the
company in question; [the defendants] also needed those investors to purchase the
stock thereby increasing the stock price so as to boost the credibility of the
solicitation e-mail to obtain more $1,000 payments.”59
Unlike the straightforward and sensible application of the necessity test in
Rowinski, the Fourth Circuit in Pirate Investor strained to conclude that a securities
transaction was necessary to complete the fraud involved in the case. While it may
be true that Pirate benefited from actual purchases of the mystery company’s stock,
by no means were the purchases necessary to complete the fraud. The fraud with
respect to each investor was complete when the investor paid for the special report
that revealed the identity of the mystery company. Unlike the misappropriation in
Zandford, no intervening securities transaction was necessary to complete the fraud.
Purchases by earlier investors may have aided Pirate in defrauding later investors,
but purchases of the special reports by later investors could have been completed
without anyone’s having made a purchase.
The Fourth Circuit’s tortured application of the necessity test in SEC v. Pirate
Investor suggests that the test does not, or at least should not, apply broadly to the
“in connection with” requirement. Even though the test can be applied reasonably—
as it was in Rowinski—courts should not need to strain to find the appropriate
connection in a case such as Pirate Investor where application of Rule 10b-5 so
53

Id. at 237-39.

54

Id. at 238.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 239. The opinion does not explain why Pirate received only a portion of the total
net proceeds from the sales. See id. (noting that Pirate received only $626,500 of the total net
proceeds of $1,005,000).
57

Id. at 240.

58

Id. at 245-46.

59

Id. at 246.
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clearly serves one of the fundamental purposes of the Exchange Act—to “preserv[e]
the integrity of the securities markets.”60 As the Second Circuit stated so well in In
re Ames Department Stores Inc. Stock Litigation, “[h]owever we deal with the more
difficult cases . . . we should not let them affect our understanding that ordinary
securities frauds . . . fall well within the Rule.” 61
Although the Supreme Court in O’Hagan and Zandford does not appear to have
articulated a standard to be applied broadly to Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with”
requirement, the Court in those two cases, as well as in Bankers Life, did describe
some general parameters for evaluating the requirement’s reach. First, the Rule must
be “construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.’”62 Second, while Rule 10b-5 is designed to “protect[t] the integrity of the
securities markets,”63 its remedial purposes reach beyond that goal.64 Therefore,
Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement can be met even if a “transaction is
not conducted through a securities exchange or an organized over-the-counter
market.”65 Third, the fraud need not relate to the price or value of a security.66
Fourth, a fraud can be “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities even if
the deception is not perpetrated on a party to the transaction.67 Finally, whether a
state law remedy is available is irrelevant to determining the scope of the Rule.68
B. Varying Approaches of the Courts of Appeals
With such little concrete guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have
struggled to establish a consistent approach to Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with”
requirement.69 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in
60

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 821 (2002).

61

In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 966 (2d Cir. 1993).

62

Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963))); see Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (“Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and
restrictively.”).
63

United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997).

64

See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 821-22 (noting that, although Bankers Life “recognized that
the interest in ‘preserving the integrity of the securities markets’ was one of the purposes
animating [§ 10(b), it] rejected the notion that § 10(b) is limited to serving that objective
alone.” (citing Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12)); Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12 (“[Section] 10(b)
. . . is not limited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets, though that purpose is
included.” (internal quotations omitted)).
65

Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10.

66

Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822; Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12.

67

See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658 (indicating that Section 10(b) “requires deception ‘in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security,’ not deception of an identifiable purchaser
or seller”).
68

Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12.

69

See Fletcher, supra note 33, at 91 (indicating that “there has been only confusion” in
applying the “in connection with” requirement to different scenarios); Francesca Muratori,
The Boundaries of the “In Connection With” Requirement of Rule 10b-5: Should Advertising
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Roland v. Green, “[e]ach of the circuits that has tried to contextualize the ‘coincide’
requirement has come up with a slightly different articulation of the requisite
connection between the fraud alleged and the purchase or sale of securities (or
representations about the purchase or sale of securities).”70
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example,
historically has required a causal connection—i.e., to have a transactional nexus, the
fraud must have caused the securities transaction.71 The Fifth Circuit, on the other
hand, has indicated expressly that a causal connection is not required72 and, along
with United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applies a vague standard,
one under which the “in connection with” requirement is met when the fraud and the
securities transaction are “more than tangentially related.”73
Most circuit courts have taken to heart the Supreme Court’s admonition that Rule
10b-5 is to be construed flexibly and have not adopted any fundamental principle for
applying the “in connection with” requirement. Instead, they—to varying extents—
have considered the “in connection with” requirement to be met in a variety of
circumstances, such as when a securities transaction was necessary to complete the
fraud,74 when the fraud actually caused or induced a securities transaction,75 and
be Actionable as Securities Fraud?, 56 BUS. LAW. 1057, 1061 (suggesting that the Supreme
Court’s lack of clear guidance has resulted in a “state of confusion, an outcome of inconsistent
judicial treatment in the absence of prevailing interpretive principles”).
70

Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 514 (5th Cir. 2012).

71

See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 175 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the
court previously had concluded that the “in connection with” language requires a causal
connection between the claimed fraud and the purchase or the sale of a security”). Strangely,
Rowinski makes no mention of a causal connection, leaving one to wonder whether the Third
Circuit has decided to abandon the requirement. See generally Rowinski v. Salomon Smith
Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying a multi-factor test for the “in connection
with” requirement, but not indicating that a causal connection is required).
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits also have required a causal connection. See Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Many of this court’s cases say
that a misrepresentation can be ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities only if it
influences an investment decision.”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1262
(10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]his interpretation of the ‘in connection with’ element is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s relatively broad construction and our circuit’s own requirement that there
be a causal connection between the fraud and the injury.”).
72

See Green, 675 F.3d at 519 (“By tying the ‘coincide’ requirement to ‘inducement,’ it
unnecessarily imports causation into a test whose language (‘coincide’) specifically disclaims
it.”).
73
Id. at 520; see also Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“Under our Section 10(b) cases, a misrepresentation is ‘in connection with’ the purchase or
sale of securities if there is ‘a relationship in which the fraud and the stock sale coincide or are
more than tangentially related.’” (quoting Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1131
(9th Cir. 2002))).
74

See, e.g., Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 522 (2d Cir. 2010) (“SLUSA’s ‘in
connection with’ standard is met where plaintiff’s claims ‘turn on injuries caused by acting on
misleading investment advice’—that is, where plaintiff’s claims ‘necessarily allege,’
‘necessarily involve,’ or ‘rest on’ the purchase or sale of securities.” (quoting Dabit v. Merrill
Lunch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2005))); Segal v. Fifth Third Bank,
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when the defendant intended to induce a securities transaction or influence an
investment decision or knew that the fraud would do so.76
The Fourth Circuit in Pirate Investor admirably attempted to provide some
structure to its transactional nexus analysis by adopting a specific test that
N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Segal’s allegations do not merely ‘coincide’ with
securities transactions; they depend on them.” (quoting Siepel v. Bank of Am., 526 F.3d 1122,
1124 (8th Cir. 2008)); Sofonia v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir. 2006)
(“The alleged fraudulent conduct was, therefore, an integral step in [Sofonia’s] exchange of
his membership interest for PFG stock and the present action satisfies the ‘in connection with’
requirement for SLUSA preemption.” (internal citations omitted)); Instituto de Prevision
Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The question here, then, is
whether the second amended complaint alleges . . . fraud that induced IPM to invest with PFA
. . . or a fraudulent scheme that coincided and depended upon the purchase or sale of securities
. . . .” (emphasis added)).
75
See, e.g., Romano, 609 F.3d at 522 (“We have also found that the more exacting
‘induced’ standard satisfies § 10(b)’s ‘in connection with’ requirement.” (citing Press v.
Chem. Invest. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) and United States v. Ostrander,
999 F.2d 27, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1993))); Jakubowski, 150 F.3d at 680 (“[A] causal connection . . .
between the misrepresentation and a securities transaction satisfies § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”);
Wolfson, 539 F.3d at 1262 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In this circuit, we have held that this element
requires only that there be ‘a causal connection between the allegedly deceptive act or
omission and the alleged injury.’” (quoting Arst v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. Inc., 86 F.3d 973,
977 (10th Cir. 1996))); Instituto, 546 F.3d at 1349 (“The question here, then, is whether the
second amended complaint alleges . . . fraud that induced IPM to invest with PFA . . . or a
fraudulent scheme that coincided and depended upon the purchase or sale of securities . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
76

See, e.g., Ostrander, 999 F.2d at 32-33 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Any payment to a portfolio
manager intended to induce the purchase of a firm’s securities on behalf of an investment
company easily qualifies as a ‘fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative’ act ‘in connection with’
the investment company’s acquisition of securities.”); Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 177 (3d Cir.
2000) (finding that whether an accountant “knew or . . . had reason to know” its audit report
would be used in making a tender was critical to the “in connection with” requirement as to
the audit report); Jakubowski, 150 F.3d at 679 (“Jakubowski made his statements directly to
the issuer of securities, in order to induce the issuer to accept his offer to buy. The offer was
accepted and the shares issued. How could there be a closer ‘connection’ between statements
and ‘the purchase or sale of any security’?”); Sofonia, 465 F.3d at 880 (“Any fraudulent
statements allegedly made . . . to persuade policyholders to approve this transaction most
assuredly were made ‘in connection with’ the policyholders’ purchase of PFG common
stock.”); McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996) (“While an outside
accounting firm might be blameless where it had no reason to know that its client would use
its audit report to sell securities, . . . the instant plaintiffs squarely alleged that E&Y knew that
CPC would include its audit opinion in a Form 10-K.”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Rana
Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Moreover, Sahgal intended to affect
the market for Superior’s stock . . . . Statements ‘calculated’ to influence investors meet the
‘in connection with’ requirement.”); Wolfson, 539 F.3d at 1251 (“[W]hen a non-employee
consultant causes misstatements or omissions within periodic financial reports submitted to
the Commission, knowing that those misstatements or omissions will reach investors, he can
be held primarily liable under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”); United
Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The
representations allegedly were made to induce UIH to purchase the option. As such, the
misrepresentations were made to influence UIH’s investment decision and were made in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”).
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considered four factors, which “serve to guide the inquiry” and are neither exclusive
nor mandatory.77 As indicated above, one of the factors, which the Fourth Circuit
took from Zandford, is “whether a securities sale was necessary to the completion of
the fraudulent scheme.”78 The other three factors, which the court drew from cases
decided by the Third and Tenth Circuits, are “whether the parties’ relationship was
such that it would necessarily involve trading in securities”79; “whether the defendant
intended to induce a securities transaction”80; and “whether material
misrepresentations were disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a
reasonable investor would rely.”81
C. Publicly Disseminated Information Principles
The fourth factor in Pirate Investor’s multi-factor test originates from Rule 10b-5
cases involving false or misleading information disseminated to the public. In light
of the typical broad distribution of advertisements, it is within this context that
advertisements properly are considered.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. is a significant early case that addressed the
question of when misleading statements disseminated to the public meet the “in
connection with” requirement.82 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit
considered whether an allegedly misleading press release made by a corporation not
engaged in a securities transaction met the requirement.83 Based on the legislative
history of Exchange Act § 10(b), the court concluded that the alleged fraud was
indeed within the scope of Rule 10b-5, holding that a misrepresentation is “in
connection with” a securities transaction if it is made “in a manner reasonably
calculated to influence the investing public.”84
The Second Circuit’s use of the phrase “reasonably calculated” suggests that the
“in connection with” element is met only when the person communicating intended
to influence investors. The opinion indicates, however, that intent is not required85
77
See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Pirate Investor, 580 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e
do not presume to exclude other factors that could help distinguish between fraud in the
securities industry and common law fraud that happens to involve securities.”). The Third
Circuit in Rowinski employed a similar multi-factor test. See Rowinski v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2005) (articulating a multi-factor test).
78

Pirate Investor, 580 F.3d at 244 (citing Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S.
813, 820-21 (2002)).
79

Id. at 244 (citing Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 302-03).

80

Id. (citing Wharf, 210 F.3d at 1221).

81

Id. (citing Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176).

82

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861 (2d Cir. 1968); see
In re Ames Dep’t. Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing
Texas Gulf Sulphur as a case of “great significance”).
83

Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 839-42.

84

Id. at 862.

85

Id. at 860 (“There is no indication that Congress intended that the corporations or
persons responsible for the issuance of a misleading statement would not violate the section
unless they . . . acted with wrongful motives.”); id. at 860-61 (“Congress intended to protect
the investing public in connection with their purchases and sales on Exchanges from being
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and that Congress “intended only that the device employed, whatever it might be, be
of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and in connection
therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation’s securities.”86 In
reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the fact that the investing public is
harmed by false or misleading statements regardless of their purpose.87
The Supreme Court in Basic quoted Texas Gulf Sulphur’s test for the “in
connection with” requirement when the Court considered the materiality of merger
discussions, but the Court “has never squarely addressed the validity of the Texas
Gulf test.”88 Lower courts nonetheless have continued to apply Texas Gulf Sulphur
to cases in which information is publicly disseminated and have found that the
requisite connection may be met with respect to SEC filings, press releases, public
statements, letters published in the financial press, news articles, investment research
reports, and product advertisements.89
The Second Circuit in its 1993 decision in Ames suggested that “the lesson [from
Texas Gulf Sulphur] seems to be that any material information issued by a
corporation (whose securities are publicly traded) has appropriate ‘connection’ to
constitute a 10b-5 violation if the information is misleading.” 90 The principle the
court applied in Ames, however, was somewhat narrower:
[W]hen the fraud alleged is that the plaintiff bought or sold a security in
reliance on misrepresentations as to its value, made by a defendant whose
misled by misleading statements promulgated for or on behalf of corporations irrespective of
whether . . . the corporation or its management have an ulterior purpose in making an official
release.”). But see Fletcher, supra note 33, at 935 (concluding, based on Texas Gulf Sulphur,
that “in cases in which a misleading statement was made without contemplation by the party
disseminating the statement that the investing public rely thereon, even when the public might
have actually relied on the misstatements, courts have held that the necessary connection . . .
is absent”).
86

Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 860.

87

Id. at 861.

88

McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 393; see also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
185, 235 n.13 (1988).
89

Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding that misrepresentations in investment research reports meet the “in connection with”
requirement); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2000) (remanding
case for determination as to whether public statements, a letter to shareholders published in
the financial press, and periodic SEC filings met the “in connection with” requirement);
McGann, 102 F.3d at 397 (finding that an audit report included in an SEC filing meets the “in
connection with” requirement when the auditor knows it will be included in the filing); Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n v. Rana Research, 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that issuance of
press release, “coupled with the public trading” in related securities, satisfies the “in
connection with” requirement); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1262-63
(10th Cir. 2008) (concluding that periodic SEC filings were “in connection with” securities
transactions); In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 968 (2d Cir. 1993)
(determining that statements in press releases, periodic filings, and news articles may meet the
“in connection with” requirement); In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 15657 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that advertisements in medical journals may meet the “in
connection with” requirement).
90

Ames, 991 F.2d at 965.
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position made it reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the representation
and imposed some duty on the defendant to be honest or to disclose
information, then whatever problems there may be with the case, a
connection between the fraud and the transaction should not be one of
them.91
Similarly, the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have indicated that, for publicly
disseminated information, a mere causal connection between the information and a
securities transaction satisfies Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus requirement.92
According to the Third Circuit, to meet the “in connection with” requirement, a
plaintiff need only show that the information was material when it was disseminated
and that it was “disseminated in a medium upon which a reasonable investor would
rely.”93 In adopting this rule, the Third Circuit explained:
The purpose underlying § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to ensure that investors
obtain fair and full disclosure of material facts in connection with their
decisions to purchase or sell securities. That purpose is best satisfied by a
rule that recognizes the realistic causal effect that material
misrepresentations, which raise the public’s interest in particular
securities, tend to have on the investment decisions of market participants
who trade in those securities.94
Because materiality is a separate element of a Rule 10b-5 claim,95 for the Second,
Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the “in connection with” test for publicly
disseminated information appears to boil down to whether the means by which the
information is disseminated is one on which a reasonable investor would rely. The
opinions from Third and Tenth circuits, however, suggest that intent (or more
generally, state of mind) may be an important—perhaps critical—consideration.96 In
91

Id. at 967.

92

See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (“The purpose underlying § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 . . . is
best satisfied by a rule that recognizes the realistic causal effect that material
misrepresentations . . . tend to have on the investment decisions of market participants who
trade in those securities.”); Rana Research, 8 F.3d at 1362 (“Where the fraud alleged involves
public dissemination in a document . . . on which an investor would presumably rely, the ‘in
connection with’ requirement is generally met by proof of the means of dissemination and the
materiality of the misrepresentation or omission.”); Wolfson, 539 F.3d at 1262 (“[S]everal of
our sister circuits have recognized that ‘[w]here the fraud alleged involves public
dissemination in a document . . . on which an investor would presumably rely, the “in
connection with” requirement is generally met by proof of the means of dissemination and the
materiality of the misrepresentation or omission.’” (quoting Rana Research, 8 F.3d at 1362
(citing Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d
1149, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1978)))).
93

Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176.

94

Id. (internal citations omitted).

95
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting that, to be successful in a Rule 10b-5
action, one must establish that the defendant made a material misstatement or omission).
96

For the Third Circuit in Semerenko, whether an auditor “knew or had reason to know”
that its audit report was to be disseminated publicly is critical to determining whether the
report meets Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus requirement. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 177. The
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Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., the Third Circuit “pointed out that, under the standard
which [it had] adopt[ed], the [plaintiffs were] not required to establish that the
defendants actually envisioned that [the plaintiffs] would rely upon the alleged
misrepresentations when making their investment decisions. Rather, [they] must
only show that the alleged misrepresentations were reckless.”97 The court therefore
seems to indicate that, to meet the “in connection with” requirement, a plaintiff
needs to establish either that the defendant intended that the plaintiff would rely on
the misrepresentations or were reckless in not knowing that they would. Similarly,
the Tenth Circuit in SEC v. Wolfson indicated that it is the intent of the defendant
that justifies the consideration of the medium in which information is disseminated.
According to the court, “because such documents are designed to reach investors and
to influence their decisions to transact in a publicly-traded security, any
misrepresentations contained within the documents are made “in connection with”
the purchase or sale of that security.” 98
In a number of circuits, then, whether the “in connection with” requirement is
met in public dissemination cases turns on causation or a combination of causation
and intent. For the “in connection with” requirement to be met, the relevant false or
misleading statement must be disseminated through a means on which a reasonable
investor would rely and, perhaps in the Third and Tenth Circuits, the person
disseminating the information must have intended to influence, or have been reckless
in not knowing that it could influence, the investing public.99

Second Circuit in Ames and the Ninth Circuit in Rana Research seem to indicate that evidence
of the defendant’s intent might lend support in finding that the requisite transactional nexus
exists, but that it is not necessary to meet its test for publicly disseminated information. See
Ames, 991 F.2d at 965 (noting that, not only had the defendants ignored the “well-established
rule” that Rule 10b-5 proscribes reckless behavior, but also that they “fail[ed] to acknowledge
that [the documents at issue in the cases were] precisely the sort of documents which a
reasonable investor would consider in evaluating a company’s prospects.”); Rana Research, 8
F.3d at 1362-63 (“Moreover, Sahgal intended to affect the market for Superior’s stock, as
evidenced by his statement that he issued the release in part to ‘pressure’ Borick to present the
offer to Superior’s board of directors. Statements ‘calculated’ to influence investors meet the
‘in connection with’ requirement.” (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hasho, 780 F. Supp.
1059, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)) ).
97

Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (internal citations omitted).

98

Wolfson, 539 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Rana Research, 8 F.3d at 1362 (emphasis added)).
The Tenth Circuit in Wolfson cites its decision in Wharf to support adopting a test for publicly
disseminated information adopted by the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits. Id. at 1262
(citing United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf, 210 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000)). Because
the requisite transactional nexus found in Wharf was based on intent, Wolfson’s citation of
Wharf lends further support to the importance of intent in determining whether publicly
disseminated misstatements or misleading statements are “in connection with” a securities
transaction. See Wharf, 210 F.3d at 1221 (“The representations allegedly were made to induce
UIH to purchase the option. As such, the misrepresentations were made to influence UIH’s
investment decision and were made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”
(emphasis added)).
99
In 1989, Fletcher identified these two approaches as the ones generally taken in cases
involving issuers who make misrepresentations, but who are not engaging in securities
transactions. Fletcher, supra note 33, at 932-36.
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III. HISTORICAL CONSIDERATION OF ADVERTISEMENTS AND THE “IN CONNECTION
WITH” REQUIREMENT
A. Advertising Cases
Only three cases specifically have addressed whether a misrepresentation or
omission in a product advertisement can be considered “in connection with” a
securities transaction for purposes of Rule 10b-5.100 The first case was Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co., Inc., in which the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York considered whether Rule 10b-5 applied to allegedly false and
misleading statements about the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device that were made by
A.H. Robins Co., Inc., in advertisements directed to medical providers and in patient
brochures.101 The district court determined that the Rule did not apply because the
statements did not satisfy the “in connection with” requirement.102
The defendants in Ross looked to Texas Gulf Sulphur for their defense.103
Specifically, they asserted that the “in connection with” requirement is met only
when allegedly fraudulent statements “are made in a manner reasonably calculated to
influence the investing public such as by means of the financial media,” and that the
Robins advertisements and brochures were “calculated only to influence the medical
decisions of doctors and their patients.”104 The district court in Ross agreed and
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with respect to the advertisements and brochures.105
The court noted that, in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the medium in which the statements are
made is important—it must be a medium upon which reasonable investors would
rely.106 The advertisements and brochures, the court determined, were not such
media.107 Moreover, the court observed that even the plaintiffs had agreed that the
advertisements and brochures “were [not] issued to induce purchases of Robins
securities,” but instead asserted that “the circulation and dissemination of said false
advertisements and patient brochures . . . had the effect of . . . inflat[ing] the price of
Robins’ stock.”108 According to the court, then, the plaintiffs had not alleged a

100
Muratori noted in 2001 that “[t]here is a dearth of reported cases involving corporate
marketing.” Muratori, supra note 69, at 1062. Indeed, there have not been any reported cases
since then.
101

Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 77 Civ. 1409, 1978 WL 1078, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6,
1978).
102
Id. at *4 (“The Court finds that plaintiffs have not posited a sufficient causal nexus to
make claims based on the advertisements and patient brochures.”).
103

Id. at *10.

104

Id. at *9.

105

Id. at *10.

106

Id. at *7-8.

107

Id. at *10 (“The Court finds that plaintiffs have not posited a sufficient causal nexus to
makes the claims based on the advertisements and patient brochures actionable under Rule
10b-5.”).
108

Id. at *9.
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“sufficient causal nexus” for purposes of Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with”
requirement.109
In Hemming v. Alfin Fragrances, Inc., the New York district court returned to the
question of whether misstatements in a product advertisement may be considered “in
connection with” a securities transaction. The plaintiffs in Hemming claimed that an
advertisement, brochure, and pamphlet, as well as video-screen displays at
department stores, made false representations about Glycel, a skin care product sold
by Alfin Fragrances, Inc.110 According to the plaintiffs, the false representations
were actionable under Rule 10b-5 because the defendants “were directing their
statements to investors in order to promote sales of stock” and the statements had
inflated the price of Alfin’s stock at the time they purchased their shares.111
The defendants responded that the plaintiffs’ claims were ones of false
advertising not securities fraud, and the district court agreed.112 In reaching its
decision, the court noted that the Second Circuit previously had stated that
[t]he purpose of § 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) is to protect persons who are
deceived in securities transactions—to make sure that buyers of securities
get what they think they are getting and that sellers of securities are not
tricked into parting with something for a price known to the buyer to be
inadequate or for a consideration known to the buyer not to be what it
purports to be.113
For the court in Hemming, the content of the advertising materials and their
purpose was critical. According to the court, the advertisement “concern[ed]
Glycel’s qualities as a skin care treatment, not as an investment choice.”114 The
brochure and pamphlet, the court asserted, were directed to consumers, not investors,
and “[i]t would distort the meaning of rule 10(b)(5) to allow such materials to serve
as a basis for liability.”115
The Hemming court’s decision once again reflects an emphasis on the medium or
context in which statements are made. This emphasis is particularly evident from
the fact that, while the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims as to the marketing
materials, it refused to do so as to claims relating to press releases and a presentation
to investment analysts that included statements similar to those in the advertising
materials.116
109

Id.

110

Hemming v. Alfin Fragrances, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 239, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

111

Id. at 241.

112

Id.

113

Id. (quoting Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984)).
114

Id.

115

Id. at 244-45.

116

Id. at 241, 245 (noting that, although the substance of statements allegedly included in
two press releases and made to a group of investment analysts at a luncheon was similar to
those alleged with respect to the advertising materials, the former statements were “directed
towards the financial community.”).
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The Second Circuit was the first—and has been the only—court of appeals to
consider whether a false or misleading product advertisement could meet Rule 10b5’s “in connection with” requirement. It did so in In re Carter-Wallace, Inc.
Securities Litigation, a case in which the plaintiffs alleged that Carter-Wallace, Inc.
had violated Rule 10b-5 by making false statements about Felbatol, an anti-epileptic
drug, in advertisements placed in two medical journals. 117 Carter-Wallace involved
an appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, which had found as a matter of law that statements in advertisements
published in medical journals do not satisfy Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus
requirement.118
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and held that “false
advertisements in technical journals may be ‘in connection with’ a securities
transaction if the proof at trial establishes that the advertisements were used by
market professionals in evaluating the stock of the company.”119 The plaintiffs had
used a fraud-on-the-market theory to argue that Carter-Wallace’s false statements
had an impact on the price at which they purchased Carter-Wallace common
stock.120 The Second Circuit was persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument and
determined that a “cause and effect” test applies with respect to the “in connection
with” requirement in a fraud-on-the-market case.121 Under this test, the transactional
nexus requirement is met if “statements which manipulate the market are connected
to resultant stock trading.”122
The Second Circuit concluded that Carter-Wallace’s Felbatol advertisements
could meet the test. It observed:
That the market can absorb technical medical information is neither novel
nor surprising. Technical information about the medical efficacy of new
drugs, whether found in advertisements or elsewhere, has an obvious
bearing on the financial future of a drug company. In an economy that
produces highly sophisticated products, technical information is of
enormous importance to financial analysts . . . . The fact that such
information is found in a specialized medical journal, as here, rather than
in a statement addressed to participants in financial markets . . . seems to
us irrelevant, so long as the journals are used by analysts studying the
prospects of drug companies. In fact, an analyst might consider such an
advertisement more informative than a non-technical but corresponding
statement to financial market professionals.123

117

In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 154 (2d Cir. 1998).

118

Id. at 154.

119

Id. at 156-57.

120

Id. at 156.

121

Id.

122

Id. (quoting In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.3d 953, 966 (2d Cir.
1993)).
123

Id. (internal citations omitted).
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With this in mind, the court distinguished Ross. It noted that Ross was decided
before Basic,124 in which the Supreme Court had determined that the “fraud-on-themarket theory” was a viable consideration in determining whether the reliance
element for a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 is met.125 Although the court
in Carter-Wallace did not say so explicitly, it concluded that the fraud-on-the-market
theory was equally relevant to the “in connection with” requirement and therefore
Ross’s limitation on the requirement no longer was appropriate.
B. Criticism of Carter-Wallace
Francesca Muratori in a 2001 article sharply criticized the Carter-Wallace
decision.126 Muratori claimed, among other things, that the Second Circuit had not
considered adequately the lower court decisions in Ross and Hemming and that its
decision departed from its precedent.127
According to Muratori, the Second Circuit was wrong to look to Basic in
distinguishing Ross because reliance was at issue in Basic, not the transactional
nexus requirement. The Second Circuit, she asserted, had conflated the two
elements without any meaningful discussion.128 Furthermore, she disapprovingly
observed that the Second Circuit had completely ignored Hemming, which was
decided after Basic.129 If the Second Circuit had addressed Hemming, Muratori
argued, it would have been forced to consider the fact that consumers, not investors,
are the target audience for product advertisements.130
Arguing that the Second Circuit’s decision was inconsistent with its precedent,
Muratori focused in particular on Ames and noted that the communication in that
case, unlike the advertisements in Carter-Wallace, were aimed at investors.131
Carter-Wallace, she asserted, expanded the “in connection with” requirement
beyond Ames to communications outside of the investment context.132
Muratori strongly favored the district court’s decision in Carter-Wallace that
statements in advertisements are outside the scope of Rule 10b-5 as a matter of
law.133 She argued that “[t]he universally understood nature of advertising, its
importance to the health of our economy, and the fact that it is not directed at
investors all warrant placing advertising outside the scope of the federal securities
laws.”134 Moreover, she asserted that the securities laws do not need to protect
124

Id.

125
See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988) (“It is not inappropriate to apply a
presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.”).
126

Muratori, supra note 69, at 1061.

127

Id. at 1073-74, 1076.

128

Id. at 1073.

129

Id. at 1074.

130

Id.

131

Id. at 1076.

132

Id.

133

Id. at 1081.

134

Id.
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investors with respect to advertisements because advertising is inherently “less than
truthful”135 and “no reasonable investor” would rely exclusively on statements in
advertising to make investment decisions.136 According to Muratori, it is even less
likely that financial analysts would rely on statements made in advertisements
without independent verification.137 As a result, she claimed, the market price of a
company’s securities would not be affected by false statements in advertisements.138
Therefore, those purchasing at the market price would not be harmed by such false
statements.
IV. ADVERTISEMENTS MAY MEET THE “IN CONNECTION WITH” REQUIREMENT
A. Publicly Disseminated Information Principles Allow for Advertisements to Meet
the “In Connection With” Requirement
While Muratori was correct that the communications in Ames were directed
toward the investing public, the Second Circuit in Ames did not purport to limit
application of Rule 10b-5 to publicly disseminated information directed to
investors.139 In fact, the court noted that it previously had “recognize[d] that
statements directed to the general public which affect the public’s interest in the
corporation’s stock are made in connection with sales or purchases of that stock.”140
Moreover, based on Ames, the Second Circuit rightfully looked to Basic to
distinguish Ross. In Ames, the Second Circuit recognized that Basic was not
addressing the “in connection with” requirement, but materiality and reliance.141
Nevertheless, it viewed Basic as instructive as to Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus
requirement:
While Basic Inc. addressed the reliance and materiality requirements,
rather than the connection requirement, the fraud on the market theory is
premised on the notion that fraud can be committed by any means of
disseminating false information into the market on which a reasonable
investor would rely. Because the fraud on the market may taint each
purchase of the affected stock, each purchaser who is thereby defrauded
(and, since the presumption is rebuttable, not all purchasers necessarily
are defrauded by the information) is defrauded by reason of the publicly
disseminated statement. If such a straightforward cause and effect is not a
connection, then the Rule would not punish a particularly effective means

135

Id. at 1080.

136

Id. at 1081.

137

Id.

138

Id. at 1082 (“Those few unreasonable investors who do base their investment decisions
on information found in advertisements will be inconsiderable and their collective action
trivial. As such, it will not affect market price.”).
139
See In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 967 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting
that it was not “commenting on how to analyze the more difficult cases”).
140

Id. at 966 (referring to Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980)).
141

Id. at 967.
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of reducing the integrity of, and public confidence in, the securities
markets.142
Whatever may be said about the propriety of treating the “in connection with”
requirement in a manner similar to reliance, Carter-Wallace’s doing so was
consistent with what the Second Circuit had done previously.
Cases more recent than Ames and Carter-Wallace that address the “in connection
with” requirement and publicly disseminated information certainly allow for
statements in advertising materials to meet the transactional nexus requirement. As
indicated above, the tests adopted by the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, consistent
with the Second Circuit’s approach, look to whether the medium in which a public
statement is made is one on which investors reasonably would rely. They do not
exclude—at least not wholesale—publicly disseminated information that primarily is
directed to or used by an audience other than investors. Whether false or misleading
statements in product advertisements may meet the “in connection with”
requirement, then, depends on whether investors reasonably rely on advertisements
in making investment decisions.
B. Empirical Studies Indicate that Product Advertising Affects Investor Decisions
and that Managers Use Advertising for that Purpose
Muratori argued that companies do not target investors when they advertise their
products and that “no reasonable investor” would rely exclusively on an
advertisement in making an investment decision.143 She further asserted that “[t]hose
few unreasonable investors who do base their investment decisions on information
found in advertisements will be inconsiderable and their collective action trivial.”144
If Muratori’s assertions were correct when her article was published in 2001, recent
empirical studies suggest that they are not today.145
142

Id.

143

Muratori, supra note 69, at 1081.

144

Id. at 1082.

145

See Dong Lou, Attracting Investor Attention Through Advertising 8 (Nov. 2011)
(working paper) [hereinafter Lou, Attracting Investor Attention], available at
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/loud/advertising_20111110.pdf (“The main contribution of this paper
is to explicitly link the temporary return effect of advertising to managers’ objective to
maximize the proceeds from insider sales and other forms of equity sales.”); Amit Joshi &
Dominique M. Hanssens, The Direct and Indirect Effects of Advertising Spending on Firm
Value, 74 J. MARKETING 20, 30 (Jan. 2010) (“This study provides conceptual and empirical
evidence of a positive relationship between advertising expenditures and the market value of
firms.”); Thomas Chemmanur & An Yan, Advertising, Attention, and Stock Returns 34 (Feb.
2009) (working paper series), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1340605 (“Overall, our results suggest that advertising helps a firm attract
investors’ attention in the advertising year. The attracted attention increases stock price in the
advertising year.”); Shuba Srinivasan et al., Product Innovations, Advertising and Stock
Returns 24 (May 7, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1136319 (“We find that the stock-return impact of new-product introductions is higher when
they are backed by substantial advertising investments. In other words, communicating the
differentiated added value to consumers yields higher firm-value effects of innovations,
especially for pioneering innovations. . . .”); Dong Lou, Maximizing Short-Term Stock Prices
Through Advertising 26 (Nov. 2010) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571947 (finding a “significant rise in stock price
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A 2011 study in particular concluded “that increased advertising attracts investor
attention and boosts stock returns in the short run, and that managers, who are aware
of this return pattern, opportunistically adjust advertising spending to inflate shortterm stock prices around equity sales.”146 That study suggests that retail investors,
who have limited time to evaluate investment opportunities, tend to gravitate toward
securities of companies that increase advertising and may “take advertising at face
value and respond too optimistically,” thereby generating increases in stock price.147
According to the study, the effect on stock prices is particularly significant as to
consumer products companies and companies that receive little analyst attention:
Consistent with the idea that advertising for a consumer product (e.g., the
iPhone) is more attention-grabbing (salient) than advertising for an
industrial product (e.g., a silicon plate), the documented return effect of
advertising is significantly more pronounced for firms in consumerproduct industries than those in non-consumer-product industries. In
addition, the return effect is also stronger for firms with lower analyst
coverage than those with higher coverage (adjusted for firm size), as the
former has fewer alternative information sources than the latter, thus
investors (in particular, retail investors) would have to rely more on
advertising for information when investing in the former.148
A 2009 study similarly concludes “that the advertising effect on long-run stock
returns is . . . stronger for small stocks, value stocks, and stocks that had either poor
operating performance or stock performance in the prior year.149 That same study
also suggests that advertising tends to increase trading and analyst coverage, thereby
contemporaneously affecting stock price.150
It is unclear, however, whether the effect of advertising on stock returns results
from the mere fact of advertising expenditures, from the content of advertisements,
or from both. One theory posits that stock price is affected because the very fact of
advertising signals financial health and positive future earnings.151 If this theory
explains the entire effect on stock prices, then whether an advertisement includes a
false or misleading statement is of little consequence. Studies suggest, however, that
contemporaneous to increased advertising” and indicating that the study “suggest[s] that the . .
. pattern in advertising spending around insider sales and equity offerings is most consistent
with the interpretation that managers use advertising to temporarily inflate stock prices for
their own benefit, as well as potentially, that of existing shareholders.”).
146

Lou, Attracting Investor Attention, supra note 145, at 5-6.

147

Id. at 1.

148

Id. at 2.

149

Chemmanur & Yan, supra note 145, at 5.

150

See id. (“In particular, we find that advertising increases the levels of trading turnover
and analyst coverage. The increased levels of trading turnover and analyst coverage increases
[sic] contemporary stock returns but are followed by lower future stock returns.”).
151

Joshi & Hanssens, supra note 145, at 22; see Lou, Attracting Investor Attention, supra
note 145, at 15 (“[A] signaling model argues that, while the content of advertising may be
uninformative about the firm’s future profitability and growth prospects, the act of advertising
can be a value-relevant signal . . . .”).
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content is important as well,152 and if that is so, such statements indeed may have an
effect on market price.
Because empirical evidence suggests that advertising does in fact influence
investment decisions and that managers know this, adopting the rule Muratori
suggested—that advertisements should be deemed outside the scope of Rule 10b-5
as a matter of law—is inappropriate. As the Supreme Court noted in Zandford, one
of the goals of Rule 10b-5 is to ensure the “integrity of the securities markets.”153
Removing from Rule 10b-5’s scope a communication that actually affects investor
decision-making and that, in some cases, is intended to do so, would conflict with
this goal.
C. The Approach to “Offers” Under the Securities Act of 1933 Recognizes the
Possible Effect of Advertisements on Investors
In enforcing restrictions under the Securities Act on communications related to
securities offerings, the SEC long has recognized that product advertising may—but
usually does not—constitute an impermissible communication. Accordingly, when
it implemented reforms to the communications rules in 2005, the SEC adopted rules
to facilitate advertising in the ordinary course of a company’s business. Implicit in
the SEC’s approach to advertisements in the context of the Securities Act is an
acknowledgement, consistent with the empirical studies discussed above, that
advertising can affect investor decisions. One therefore finds further support for
concluding that product advertisements can meet Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus
requirement in the treatment of such advertisements under the Securities Act.
1. The “Gun-Jumping Rules”
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)154 provides stringent
restrictions—known as “gun-jumping rules”—on how issuers may communicate
with respect to an offering of securities.155 Specifically, the gun-jumping rules
restrict “offers,” both as to their timing and as to their form. Under section 5(c), it is
unlawful “to offer to sell or offer to buy . . . any security, unless a registration
statement has been filed as to such security.”156 After a registration statement is
filed, section 5(b)(1) makes it unlawful to use a “prospectus relating to any security
with respect to which [the] registration statement [was] filed . . . , unless such
prospectus meets the requirements of section 10 [of the Securities Act].”157 The term
152

See Lou, Attracting Investor Attention, supra note 145, at 16 (indicating that the
“signaling model” is incomplete because it does not explain why, subsequent to increased
advertising, stock prices decline); Joshi & Hanssens, supra note 145, at 22 (“We hypothesize
that [brand] equity, which is created through marketing activity and is ostensibly directed at
customers and prospects, can spill over into investment behavior as well.”).
153

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 821 (2002).

154

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).

155
See Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,731 (Aug. 3, 2005) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 200) (2012)) (referring to sections 5(b)(1) and 5(c) as “gun jumping
provisions”).
156

15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006) (emphasis added).

157

15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2006).
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“prospectus” extends to any “communication, written or by radio or television,
which offers any security for sale.”158
The term “offer” is broadly defined, making the restrictions imposed under the
gun-jumping rules significant. The term includes not only formal offers,159 but also
any communication that conditions the market for a securities offering.160 The SEC
explained in In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co. that a broad definition of the term
“offer” is necessary to serve the purposes of section 5, one of which is to ensure that
extensive information with respect to a person issuing securities is available to
investors and that investors have time to consider the information.161 The SEC
observed that:
[s]ecurities are distributed in this country by a complex and sensitive
machinery geared to accomplish nationwide distribution of large
quantities of securities with great speed. Multi-million dollar issues are
often oversubscribed on the day the securities are made available for sale.
This result is accomplished by a network of prior informal indications of
158

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(9) (2006) (emphasis added). The term “written” likewise is broad
and includes most electronic communications, including e-mail, facsimiles, and websites. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2012) (defining the term “written communication” to include a “graphic
communication” and defining the term “graphic communication” to include “all forms of
electronic media, [except] . . . communication[s] that . . . originate[] live, in real-time to a live
audience and do[] not originate in recorded form”).
159

See Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The statutory
language defining ‘offer’ in § 2(3) ‘goes well beyond the common law concept of any
offer.’”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. Wash. 1940) (“The
Act defines . . . ‘offer to sell,’ and ‘offer for sale,’ likewise more broadly than the lawyer or
the layman previously thought or even imagined.”); In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-5870, 1959 WL 59531, at *4 (Feb. 9, 1959) (“It is apparent that
[the term ‘offer to sell’ is] not limited to communications which constitute an offer in the
common law contract sense, or which on their face purport to offer a security.”). Section 2(3)
of the Securities Act defines the term “offer” to “include every attempt or offer to dispose of,
or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.” 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(3) (2006).
160

See Loeb, Rhoades, 1959 WL 59531, at *6 (“[T]he statute prohibits issuers,
underwriters and dealers from initiating a public sales campaign prior to the filing of a
registration statement by means of publicity efforts which, even though not couched in terms
of an express offer, condition the public mind or arouse public interest in the particular
securities.”); Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a Registration
Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-3844, 1957 WL 3605, at *2 (Oct. 8, 1957) (“[T]he
publication of information and statements, . . . although not couched in terms of an express
offer, may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest . . . in
a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling
effort.”); Guidelines for Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities are in
Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 1971 WL 120474, at *1 (Aug. 20, 1971)
(“[T]he publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts, made in advance of a
proposed financing which have the effect of conditioning the public mind or arousing public
interest in the issuer or in its securities constitutes an offer in violation of the Act.”).
161
See Loeb, Rhoades, 1959 WL 59531, at *5 (describing “[o]ne of the cardinal purposes
of the Securities Act”). Loeb, Rhoades “is the seminal and still leading SEC decision” on the
scope of the term “offer” under the Securities Act. HAZEN, supra note 11, § 2.3[2], at 83.
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interest or offers to buy between underwriters and dealers and between
dealers and investors based upon mutual expectations that, at the moment
when sales may legally be made, many prior indications will immediately
materialize as purchases. It is wholly unrealistic to assume in this context
that “offers” must take any particular legal form. Legal formalities come
at the end to record prior understandings, but it is the procedures by which
these prior understandings, embodying investment decisions, are obtained
or generated which the Securities Act was intended to reform.162
The SEC recognized, though, that it can be difficult to determine whether the
release of particular information is part of an effort to sell securities or is an
unrelated disclosure.163 According to the SEC, “[w]hether in any particular case
publicity is an offer depends upon all the facts, and the surrounding circumstances
including the nature, source, distribution, timing, and apparent purpose and effect of
the published material.”164
In Loeb, Rhoades, the SEC specifically addressed product advertising and stated
that, when carried out in the ordinary course of business, it does not condition the
market for a securities offering.165 Implicit in the SEC’s statement, however, is that
advertisements outside the ordinary course of business may condition the market,
and in guidance issued prior to Loeb, Rhoades, the SEC cited as an example of a
communication it considered to violate section 5 an “advertisement [that] took the
conventional form of a product advertisement except for the inclusion of calculations
of per-share asset values.”166
At its core, the “conditioning the market” concept is just another way of
identifying when a particular communication is connected to a particular securities
transaction. Consequently, the fact that an advertisement may condition the market
for a securities offering likewise suggests that an advertisement may meet Rule 10b5’s “in connection with” requirement.167
162

Loeb, Rhoades, 1959 WL 59531, at *5.

163

Id. at *7.

164

Id. at *7 n.20.

165

Id. at *6.

166

The issuer published the widely-circulated advertisement after it had filed a registration
statement and sales of the securities proved difficult. Because the issuer had filed a
registration statement, the advertisement was not alleged to violate Securities Act § 5(c), but
Securities Act § 5(b)(1). Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a
Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-3844, 1957 WL 3605, at *4 (Oct. 8,
1957
167

The language used by the SEC in Loeb, Rhoades with respect to conditioning the
market and by the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur with respect to the “in connection
with” requirement highlights the similarity of the principles involved. For example, finding
that a press release conditioned the market, the SEC in Loeb, Roades observed that the
“release . . . was of a character calculated, by arousing and stimulating investor and dealer
interest . . . , to set in motion the processes of distribution. In fact it had such an effect.”
Loeb, Rhoades, 1959 WL 59531, at *6 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
the Second Circuit found that a representation is “in connection with” a securities transaction
if it is made “in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public” and is so
calculated if it is “of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and in
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The SEC also has recognized that advertisements that do not condition the
market for a securities offering nevertheless may have an effect on, or a connection
to, securities transactions. Acknowledging that “the publication periodically of
material business and financial facts, knowledge of which is essential to an informed
trading market in such securities,” is a basic purpose of the securities laws, the SEC
in 1971 attempted to provide guidance as to what types of communications generally
are not considered to be conditioning the market even though a company is planning
a public offering.168 Although the commission declined to offer a comprehensive list
of communications that do not violate Securities Act § 5, the SEC encouraged
issuers intending a public offering to continue to advertise their products and
services, to send out periodic reports to investors, to make press releases as to
“factual business and financial development,” and to respond to inquiries regarding
“factual matters from securities analysts, financial analysts, security holders, and
participants in the communications filed who have a legitimate interest in corporate
affairs.”169
In considering the significance of advertisements among the SEC’s list of
permissible communications, one must bear in mind that the gun-jumping rules
restrict communications with respect to a forthcoming public offering, not
communications with respect to securities that already are outstanding. In fact, the
SEC in its 1971 guidance wished to encourage communications designed to inform
investors in the secondary market. As the SEC had noted previously in Loeb,
Rhoades, “[t]his flow of normal corporate news, unrelated to a selling effort for an
issue of securities, is natural, desirable and entirely consistent with the objective of
disclosure to the public which underlies the federal securities laws.”170
The fact, then, that the SEC included product advertisements in its 1971 list is
peculiar. Periodic reports, press releases, and responses to inquiries by analysts and
investors clearly are designed to inform investors and are directed toward them.
Advertisements, on the other hand, typically are designed to sell products and are
targeted to customers. By including product advertisements among investor-focused
communications, the SEC either was acknowledging the importance of such
advertisements in informing the market or was responding to a concern that such
advertisements might be perceived as informing the market. Regardless of its
purpose, the SEC recognized that product advertisements may have a connection to
securities transactions.
2. 2005 Securities Offering Reform
The SEC in its 2005 Securities Offering Reform gave further attention to the
interplay between the gun-jumping rules and an issuer’s advertising efforts.
Through the reform, the SEC sought to update the Securities Act’s approach to

connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation’s securities.”
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 862, 860 (2d Cir. 1968)
(emphasis added).
168

Guidelines for Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities are Registration,
Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 1971 WL 120474, at *1-2 (Aug. 20, 1971).
169

Id. at *2.

170

Loeb, Rhoades, 1959 WL 59531, at *7.
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public offerings and to provide relief from the statute’s very rigid requirements.171
One of the primary areas of reform related to communications with respect to
registered offerings, and through new regulations, the SEC intended to aid investor
and market access to information.172
In adopting the reform, the SEC observed that:
issuers engage in all types of communications on an ongoing basis,
including, importantly, communications mandated or encouraged by . . .
rules under the Exchange Act, rules or listing standards of national
securities exchanges, and comparable requirements in foreign
jurisdictions . . . [and that] [such] changes in the Exchange Act disclosure
regime and the tremendous growth in communications technology are
resulting in more information being provided to the market on a more
non-discriminatory, current, and ongoing basis.173
The SEC viewed these developments as positive and sought to facilitate the flow
of information by relaxing the restrictions the gun-jumping rules place on
“communications that would be beneficial to investors and markets.”174 The reform
did this in a number of ways, including the adoption of Rules 168 and 169 under the
Securities Act, which give issuers greater certainty that the regular release of factual
information, including product advertisements, will not be considered to be
conditioning the market for—or, said another way, connected to—a public
offering.175
Rules 168 and 169 facilitate the flow of information by deeming certain
communications not to be offers and therefore not subject to the restrictions in
Securities Act §§ 5(b)(1) and 5(c).176 Rule 168, which is available only to SEC
reporting companies and certain foreign issuers, exempts a broader range of
communications than does Rule 169, which is available to all issuers, including nonreporting companies.177 Both rules, however, protect “regularly released factual
171
See Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005) (“Today’s
rules will eliminate unnecessary and outmoded restrictions on offerings.”).
172

Id. at 44,725.

173

Id. at 44,731.

174

Id.

175

Id. at 44,735; 17 C.F.R. § 230.168(b)(1) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.169(b)(1) (2012). The
safe harbors in Rules 168 and 169 are over-inclusive, purporting to exempt from the
requirements of section 5 communications that would not be considered to condition the
market under prior SEC interpretations. For example, in its 1959 opinion in Loeb, Rhoades,
the SEC indicated that a corporation may, without running afoul of section 5, continue to
advertise its products in the ordinary course of its business. Loeb, Rhoades, 1959 WL 59531,
at *7. Likewise, in its 1971 release, the SEC reiterated that product advertisements generally
do not condition the market in violation of section 5. Guidelines for Release of Information
by Issuers Whose Securities are Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 1971 WL
120474, at *2 (Aug. 20, 1971). Nevertheless, the SEC adopted Rules 168 and 169, which
offer a safe harbor for product advertisements.
176

17 C.F.R. § 230.168(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.169(a) (2012).

177

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.168(a) (2012) (providing that the exemption under the Rule only
applies to “[a]n issuer that is required to filed reports pursuant to section 13 or section 15(d) of
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business information,”178 and under both rules, product advertisements are
considered to be factual business information.179
In addition to advertisements, both rules extend to “[f]actual information about
the issuer, its business or financial developments, or other aspects of its business,”
including, for reporting companies, information included in periodic reports to the
SEC.180 Just as it did in its 1971 guidance, then, the SEC in Rules 168 and 169
included advertisements with information specifically directed to investors, perhaps
suggesting once again that advertisements may inform the market and therefore have
a connection to securities transactions.
V. DETERMINING WHEN AN ADVERTISEMENT MEETS THE “IN CONNECTION WITH”
REQUIREMENT
As discussed above, the causation and intent-based approaches to the “in
connection with” requirement as it relates to publicly disseminated information leave
the door open for finding that false or misleading statements in product
advertisements are subject to Rule 10b-5. Moreover, recent empirical studies, the
SEC’s historical treatment of advertisements for purposes of the gun-jumping rules,
and the treatment of advertisements in the 2005 Securities Offering Reform indicate
that advertisements may, and probably do, have an impact on investor decisionmaking. If that is the case, the question then becomes how a court decides when a
particular statement included in an advertisement meets the “in connection with”
requirement.
A. Public Companies and the Causation-Based Approach
In Carter-Wallace, the Second Circuit concluded that it could not find as a matter
of law that allegedly false statements in pharmaceutical advertisements published in
technical journals were not “in connection with” transactions in the pharmaceutical
company’s securities on the secondary market.181 To the contrary, the court held that
such advertisements satisfy Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus requirement if a
plaintiff can prove that market professionals used the advertisements in analyzing the
company’s securities.182 In so doing, the court rejected the 1978 decision of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Ross that such
advertisements do not have the appropriate nexus.183
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” and certain foreign companies and exempting “regularly
released factual business information and forward-looking information”); 17 C.F.R. §
230.169(a) (2012) (exempting only “regularly released factual business information”).
Although technically available to them, reporting companies have no reason to use Rule 169
because all of the information subject to exemption under Rule 169 is subject to exemption
under Rule 168 and the conditions for exemption under Rule 168 are less onerous than those
under Rule 169. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.168(b)(1), (d) (2012), with 17 C.F.R. §
230.169(b)(1), (d) (2012).
178

17 C.F.R. § 230.168(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.169(a) (2012).

179

17 C.F.R. § 230.168(b)(1)(ii) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.169(b)(1)(ii) (2012).

180

17 C.F.R. § 230.168(b)(1)(i) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.169(b)(1)(i) (2012).

181

Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hoyt, 150 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 1998).

182

Id. at 156-57.

183

Id. at 156.
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The Second Circuit distinguished Ross because it was decided before the
Supreme Court in Basic had recognized the relevance of the “fraud-on-the-market”
theory to the element of reliance in a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5.184 In
light of the fact that the key to the test adopted by many courts with respect to
publicly disseminated information is whether the information is of a type on which
reasonable investors would rely, the court’s conclusion in Carter-Wallace makes
perfect sense. Acknowledging the efficacy of a presumption of reliance, the
Supreme Court in Basic observed that “[r]ecent empirical studies [had] tended to
confirm . . . that the market price of shares traded on a well-developed market
reflects all publicly available information, and, hence any material
misrepresentations.”185 Consistent with this premise, Carter-Wallace noted that the
ability of the market to “absorb technical medical information is neither novel nor
surprising.”186 It seems even more likely that the market could—and based on recent
empirical studies, it appears the market does—incorporate the less technical and
more readily available information in ordinary product advertisements such as those
for Apple’s iPad.
Since Carter-Wallace was decided in 1998, due to technological advances, a
wide array of information has become more readily available. The SEC recognized
this fact when it adopted the 2005 Securities Offering Reform and noted that
[c]omputers, sophisticated financial software, electronic mail,
teleconferencing, videoconferencing, webcasting, and other technologies
available today have replaced, to a large extent, paper, pencils,
typewriters, adding machines, carbon paper, paper mail, travel, and faceto-face meetings relied on previously. The rules we are adopting today
seek to recognize the integral role that technology plays in timely
informing the markets and investors about important corporate
information and developments.187
The most significant changes under the reform with respect to the gun-jumping
rules’ limitations on communications benefit large issuers known as “well-known
seasoned issuers” or “WKSIs.”188 WKSIs are almost completely exempt from the
gun-jumping rules.189
184
See id. at 156 (“Ross pre-dated Basic . . . and considered only the nexus between
advertisements and individual investments; it did not consider the “fraud-on-the-market”
theory . . . .”).
185

Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).

186

Carter-Wallace, 150 F.3d at 153.

187

Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,726 (Aug. 3, 2005).

188

Id. at 44,727. A WKSI is a public company whose outstanding common equity held by
non-affiliates has a “worldwide market value” of at least $700 million or who in the prior
three years has made registered offerings for cash of at least $1 billion of non-convertible
securities. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2012) (defining the term “well-known seasoned issuer”).
189

The SEC did this in two ways primarily. First, it introduced the “automatic shelf
registration statement” concept. Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,777; see 17
C.F.R. § 230.405 (2012) (defining the term “automatic shelf registration statement”). A
WKSI may file an automatic shelf registration statement to register “unspecified amounts of
different types of specified securities.” Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,777;
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In relaxing the gun-jumping rules with respect to WKSIs, the SEC relied on the
fact that “[t]oday, the largest issuers are followed by sophisticated institutional and
retail investors, members of the financial press, and numerous sell-side and buy-side
analysts that actively seek new information on a continual basis.”190 Given the
attention the market gives to WKSIs, it seems very likely that the market price of
their securities incorporates material information included in their product
advertisements. Moreover, the empirical studies described above suggest that, not
only are the stock prices for securities of large issuers affected by advertising, but
those of small issuers are as well and that the market price effect for securities of
small issuers tends to be more pronounced.191 Therefore, it seems almost a foregone
conclusion that statements made by public companies in their product
advertisements would meet a causation-based test for Rule 10b-5’s transactional
nexus requirement.
B. Factors from the Approach to “Offers” Under the Securities Act of 1933
Given that a determination of whether a particular communication conditions the
market for a securities offering is, in essence, a determination of whether the
communication is connected to the offering, the SEC’s historical guidance as to
when a communication conditions the market and the conditions under which the
safe harbor in Rule 169192 is available are useful tools for determining whether a

see 17 C.F.R. § 230.430B (2012) (“[A] form of prospectus filed as part of an automatic shelf
registration statement for offerings pursuant to Rule 415(a) . . . , other than Rule 415(a)(vii) or
(viii), also may omit information as to . . . a description of the securities other than an
identification of the name or class of such securities.”); 17 C.F.R. § 230.457(r) (2012)
(indicating that an automatic shelf registration statement “does not need to include the number
of shares or units of securities or the maximum aggregate offering price of any securities until
the issuer” updates the table in the registration statement calculating the registration fee). The
issuer also may add securities to the registration statement after it becomes effective.
Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,779; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.413(b)(1) (2012)
(allowing amendment of automatic shelf registration statements to add new classes of
securities). By filing automatic shelf registration statements, then, WKSIs can eliminate as to
a wide range of securities the restrictions against offers in section 5(c), because section 5(c)
only applies pre-filing. Second, the 2005 reform added Rule 163, which exempts WKSIs
from the prohibition against offers in section 5(c) as to securities for which no registration
statement has been filed, so long as the WKSI meets the conditions of the rule. See Securities
Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,741 (noting that Rule 163 allows WKSIs “to engage in
unrestricted oral and written offers before a registration statement is filed”); 17 C.F.R. §
230.163(a) (2012) (providing that communications complying with the rule are exempt from
the prohibition against offers under Exchange Act § 5(c)).
190

Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,727.

191
See Lou, Attracting Investor Attention, supra note 145, at 2 (noting the effect of
advertising on the market price of securities for companies that are not followed closely by
analysts).
192
Rule 168 also provides conditions that can be useful as factors, but the same conditions
apply in Rule 169. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.168(d)(1), (2) (2012), with 17 C.F.R. §
230.169(d)(1), (2) (2012). Rule 169, however, includes an additional condition that is
relevant to the “in connection with” requirement. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.169(d)(3) (2012)
(imposing a condition not included in Rule 168).
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false or misleading statement in an advertisement meets Rule 10b-5’s “in connection
with” requirement.193
In Loeb, Rhoades, the SEC stated that whether particular publicity is connected
with the selling effort for a public offering depends on the facts and circumstances of
the publicity and, in evaluating whether such a connection exists, consideration
should be given to “the nature, source, distribution, timing, and apparent purpose and
effect of the published material.”194 Rule 169, because it is a safe harbor, offers
more concrete considerations. Under Rule 169, a product advertisement will be
deemed not to be an offer (and therefore not subject to the restrictions in Securities
Act § 5) if it is “regularly released or disseminated” and:
(1) The issuer has previously released or disseminated information of the
type described in this section in the ordinary course of its business; (2)
The timing, manner, and form in which the information is released or
disseminated is consistent in material respects with similar past releases
or disseminations; [and] (3) The information is released or disseminated
for intended use by persons, such as customers and suppliers, other than
in their capacities as investors or potential investors in the issuer’s
securities, by the issuer’s employees or agents who historically have
provided such information . . . .195
The considerations and conditions described above can provide valuable insight
both as to whether there is a causal link between a false or misleading advertisement
and a securities transaction and as to whether a defendant intended an advertisement
to, or knew or was reckless in not knowing that the advertisement could, influence
an investment decision. If an advertisement deviates from a company’s ordinary
practice, it may be more likely that an investor would take note of it and rely on it.
Likewise, such a deviation may indicate that the company intended to influence the
market. Therefore, the considerations and conditions could prove useful to a court
applying the “in connection with” requirement regardless of whether the court takes
a pure causation-based approach or it adds—as the Third and Tenth Circuit may—an
intent-based component.
CONCLUSION
In 1998, the Second Circuit in Carter-Wallace opened the door to securities fraud
claims based on false or misleading statements in marketing materials. When it was
decided, Carter-Wallace was consistent with the Second Circuit’s general approach
to Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus requirement with respect to publicly
disseminated statements. It is consistent today with similar approaches adopted by
193
See Benjamin Shook, The Materiality Standard After Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 12 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 369, 383 (Spring 2011) (suggesting that “[t]he SEC may
view normal advertising in the Rule 10b-5 context in the same way as it does in the context of
public offerings”).
194

In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-5870, 1959 WL
59531, at *7 n.20 (Feb. 9, 1959).
195

17 C.F.R. § 230.169(d) (2012). Qualification for the safe harbor also is conditioned on
the issuer’s not being an investment company under the Investment Company Act. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.169(d)(4) (2012). That condition, however, is irrelevant to Rule 10b-5’s “in connection
with” requirement.
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other circuits. In addition, the SEC for more than fifty years has acknowledged that
product advertisements may communicate information to investors, and recent
empirical studies suggest that product advertisements indeed do so and that
managers know it. Therefore, even if it did at one time, Rule 10b-5’s “in connection
with” requirement no longer stands as a substantial barrier to application of the Rule
to false or misleading product advertising. As a result, Apple and other companies
should think hard before using marketing materials with bold and unqualified
representations about their products’ capabilities.
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